Bankruptcy Courts Lack Authority to Issue Writs of Habeas Corpus

In the case of In re Kluever, ___ B.R. ___, 2007 WL 2213365 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla.,2007)(Funk, J.), the court held that bankruptcy courts lack the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus. The Debtor filed an emergency motion for writ of mandamus, habeas corpus or similar relief pursuant to section 105(a) after he was arrested and incarcerated in Florida as a result of a warrant issued in Wisconsin for failure to pay child support. The Debtor asserted that his arrest and incarceration were an attempt to collect a debt in violation of the automatic stay.

The court held that bankruptcy courts lack the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus. Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code only provides that a bankruptcy court “may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of” this title.” The court also found that section 2241(a) does not imbue bankruptcy courts with the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. Section 2241(a) provides that [W]rits of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions.” See Bryan v. Rainwater, 254 B.R. 273, 276 (N.D.Ala.2000). In re Cornelious, 214 B.R. 588 (Bankr.E.D.Ark.1997).

The court did note that it made no determination as to whether Wisconsin’s actions violated the automatic stay.

Jordan E. Bublick, Attorney at Law, Practice Limited to Bankruptcy Law, Board Certified Specialist in Consumer Bankruptcy Law (American Board of Certification), Member of the Florida Bar since 1983

Section 548 Given Extraterritorial Application

The case of In re French, 440 F.3d 145 (4th Cir. 2006) presented the question of whether a U.S. Bankruptcy Court can avoid a constructively fraudulent transfer of foreign real estate between U.S. residents. The court held that the presumption against extraterritoriality, assuming it applied, did not prevent the application of the fraudulent transfer statute and that the doctrine of international comity did not require application of Bahamian bankruptcy law rather than the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.

In this case, the Chapter 7 trustee filed an adversary proceeding to avoid the transfer of the Bahamian real property by the debtor to her children. The trustee alleged that the debtor and the transferees had engaged in a constructively fraudulent transfer because the debtor had been insolvent at the time of the transfer and received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange. See 11 USC section 548(a)(1)(B). The transferees filed a motion to dismiss and argued that the section 548 should not apply to foreign property based on the presumption against extraterritoriality and that considerations of international comity counseled the application of Bahamian rather than U.S. bankruptcy law.

The court noted that it is a principle of American law that legislation of Congress is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdictio of the U.S. unless a contrary intent appear. The court stated that although the parties had assumed that the application of section 548 to the transfer here is extraterritorial, the court needed to consider whether the presumption against extraterritorial application applies at all. The court noted that the U.S., courts only apply this presumption against extraterritoriality when a party seeks to enforce a statute beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991). The presumption has no bearing when the conduct which Congress seeks to regulate occurs largely within the U.S., ie. when regulated conduct is domestic rather than extraterritorial. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C.Cir.1993).

The court stated that although it had never defined when conduct is extraterritorial for purposes of the presumption, it has recognized that a similar inquiry-defining “foreign conduct”-is particularly challenging in cases (like this one) that involve a “mixture of foreign and domestic elements.” Dee-K Enters., Inc. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd., 299 F.3d 281, 286 (4th Cir.2002).The court concluded that a flexible test taking into account all component events of the transfer is appropriate to determine whether an allegedly fraudulent transfer occurred
extraterritorially. The court noted that the perpetrator and most of the victims of the fraudulent transfer were located in the U.S and the effects of this transfer were felt most strongly in the U.S. and not in the Bahamas. The court also found significant that domestic facts and conduct established both of the elements of the section 548 constructively fraudulent transfer, ie. the insolvency of the debtor and the receipt of less than a reasonably equivalent value. The court found the recordation of the deed in the Bahamas as insignificant as a foreign fact or conduct. The court though did recognize as important the fact that the real property was located in the Bahamas as the law has long recognized the powerful interest that states and nations have in the real property within their boundaries and that the strength of that interest explains why the law of the situs generally applies to real property.

But the court held that it need not resolve the “slippery question” of whether there was extraterritorial application as even if it were assumed that the application of the Bankruptcy Code would be extraterritorial, the presumption against extraterritoriality does not prevent its application to the transfer herein.
The court concluded that the presumption must give way when Congress exercises its undeniable authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States as it did with section 548.

The transferees next argued that even if the presumption against extraterritoriality does not prevent extension of section 548 to the transaction, that the court should refrain from applying the statute under the doctrine of international comity, particularly as this is a dispute concerning real property which should be governed by the law of the situs. The court reviewed what the Supreme Court has referred to as the factors as to the application of the doctrine of international comity and concluded that these factors did not require the court to refrain from applying the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in favor of Bahamian bankruptcy law.

Jordan E. Bublick, Attorney at Law, Practice Limited to Bankruptcy Law, Board Certified Specialist in Consumer Bankruptcy Law (American Board of Certification), Member of the Florida Bar since 1983

Denial of Motion to Revoke Technical Abandonment

I previously reviewed the case of In re Bast, ___ BR ___, 2007 WL 1429481 (Bkrtcy.S.D. Fla.)(Friedman, J.) where the court found that the requirements for a technical abandonment of certain non-exempt real property were met and that it was therefore abandoned from the estate to the debtor at the close of the case. The trustee’s subsequent efforts to administer the non-exempt real property for the benefit of the creditors were denied by the Court.

On August 8, 2007, the case of In re O’Neal, ___ B.R. ___, 2007 WL 2296450 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Fla.)(Friedman,J.) was issued. In this case a successor Chapter 7 trustee attempted to vitiate an abandonment by his predecessor of an interest in certain stock. The successor trustee’s Motion to Reopen the Case was granted and the trustee filed a Motion to Revoke Technical Abandonment. The court denied the Motion to Revoke Technical Abandonment as it held that a reopening of the case does not automatically revoke a technical abandonment and that there were otherwise no equitable circumstances for a revocation.

The Debtor’s chapter 7 case was filed and discharged as a “no asset” case. The Debtor had scheduled the stock in his schedule B with a value of $1. Apparently the stock was worth considerably more. The trustee claimed that the Debtor intentionally mislead him as to the value of the stock.

The court denied the trustee’s motion to revoke technical abandonment. The court noted that property which is not sold or otherwise administered during the bankruptcy case is deemed abandoned upon the closingn of the case. 11 USC 554(c). The court noted that the courts have disagreed about the effect of reopening a case when property was previously technically abandoned pursuant to Section 554(c). The court held that it disagreed with the cases that held that a reopening, if not limited, automatically revokes technical abandonment as this would eliminate the finality that Section 554(c) was intended to provide and would eliminate the incentive for the trustee to investigage estate assets carefully before closing a case.

The court held that although reopening does not automatically revoke the technical abandonment, that the court may order that property not be considered abandoned after a reopening based upon equitable circumstances, such as when misleading information was given to the trustee. The court held that this position is in accordance with the language in section 554(c) which provides “unless the court order otherwise…” which requires some cause for such an order which deviates from the norm of technical abandonment under section 554(c). The court noted that its view is essentially the same as that in In re Woods, 173 F.3d 770 (10th Cir.1999) which held that the reopening of a case does not automatically vitiate the abandonment of property under section 554(c), but that a court may under FRBP 9024 vacate the abandonment if the standards of that rule which are the equivalent of FRCP 60 are met.

Jordan E. Bublick, Attorney at Law, Practice Limited to Bankruptcy Law, Board Certified Specialist in Consumer Bankruptcy Law (American Board of Certification), Member of the Florida Bar since 1983

Section 541(a) Has Extraterritorial Effect

In the case of In re Rajapakse, 346 B.R. 233 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Gla.2005)(Massey, J.), the Chapter 7 Trustee sought an order directing the pro se chapter 7 Debtor to turn over certain property located outside of the U.S. The Debtor claimed that the property was not property of the estate and was outside the Court’s jurisdiction. The Court granted the Trustee’s motion and directed the Debtor to turn over and account for all the foreign assets.

Section 541 provides that the commencement of a case creates an estate comprised of property listed in Section 541(a) with certain exceptions, “wherever located and by whomever held.” 11 USC 541 (a). The court noted that the phrase “wherever located and by whomever held” is extremely broad and could be interpreted to cover property owned outside of the U.S. The court pointed out though that Section 541 does not expressly state that it applies outside of the U.S.

The court discussed that Congress has the power to enact a statute that applies beyond the territorial borders of the U.S, but that there is a presumption that Acts of Congress do not ordinarily apply outside the borders of the U.S. If a statute does not expressly state that is applies outside of the U.S., a court must determine whether Congress intended the statue to have extraterritorial effect. E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).

The court concluded that while Section 541 is ambiguous regarding its possible extraterritorial effect, its legislative history is not. The court noted that the House Report accompanying a 1952 amendment to Section 541 makes its clear that a trustee in bankruptcy is vested with the title of the bankrupt in property within or without the U.S. The court noted that Collier on Bankruptcy confirms this interpretation that Section 70a of the Act was amended in 1952 to make it clear that a trustee in bankruptcy is vested with the title to property within or without the U.S. by the addition of the words “wherever located.” Collier on Bankruptcy, Vol. $A, para 70.03, p. 35 (14th Ed. 1978). The court noted that other courts addressing this issue have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g. H.K. and Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon, 153 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir.1998), GMAM Investment Funds Trust I v. Blobo Comunicacoes E. Participacoes S.S., 317 B.R. 235 (S.DN.Y.2004), Deak & Co. v. Soedjono, 63 B.R. 422, 427 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1986), Nakash v. Zur, 190 B.R. 763, 768 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1996), In re Yukos Oil Co. 321 B.R. 396, 406 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.2005).

Jordan E. Bublick, Attorney at Law, Practice Limited to Bankruptcy Law, Board Certified Specialist in Consumer Bankruptcy Law (American Board of Certification), Member of the Florida Bar since 1983

Lack of Specific Personal Jurisdiction over Candian Creditor

On May 16, 2007, the court issued its decision in the case of In re Thermoview Industries, Inc., ___ B.R. ___, 2007 WL 1447855 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Ky.)(Lloyd, J.), in which the Chapter 11 Trustee brought a preference action against a Canadian corporation. The court held that it lacked specific personal jurisdiction over the the Canadian creditor and dismissed the adversary proceeding.

The Canadian corporation had it principal place of business in Canada. It did not do business in the U.S. and it was not registered to do business in the U.S. The Debtors purchased items from the Creditor FOB the plant in Canada. The Trustee attempted to serve the Canadian Creditor by mail and further measures in compliance with the Hague Convention’s requirements. The Trustee contended that the fact that the Debtor’s purchased products FOB the creditor’s Canadian plan was sufficient to confer specific personal jurisdiction. The Trustee did not contend that there was “continuous and systemmatic” contacts with the forum as is required for general personal jurisdiction.

The court noted that in order to establish the existence of specific jurisdiction, a three part test must be met: 1. the defendant must purposely avail himself of the privilege of acting in the forum state or cause a consequence in the forum state, 2. the cause of action must arise from the defendant’s activities there, and 3. the acts of the defendant or consequences must have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable. Southern Machines Co., Inc. v. Mohasco Industries, Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 1968). All three elements must be met to invoke personal jurisdiction. LAK, Inc. v. Deercreek Enterprices, 885 F.2d, 1293, 1303 (6th Cir.1989).

As to meeting element number one, the court noted the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal’s preference for the “stream of commerce plus” approach in analyzing whether a defendant purposely avails itself of the privilege of acting in the forum state. Under this theory, the placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposely directed toward the forum State.

The creditor sought dismissal of the complain based on lack of personal jurisdiction and insufficient service of process. The court noted that the record before the court showed that creditor was not registered to do business in the U.S. and that it in fact did not do business in the U.S. The court found merit in the creditor’s arguments and dismissed the preference adversary proceeding

Jordan E. Bublick, Attorney at Law, Practice Limited to Bankruptcy Law, Board Certified Specialist in Consumer Bankruptcy Law (American Board of Certification), Member of the Florida Bar since 1983

Bear Stearns Hedge Funds File Cayman Insolvency Proceedings and U.S. Chapter 15 Cases

On July 31, 2007, two Bear Stearn’s hedge funds filed insolvency petitions in the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands. The two funds, which were limited liability companies organized and incorporated in the Cayman Islands, were the Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund Ltd. (”High-Grade Fund”) and the Bear Sterns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Master Fund Ltd. (”Enhanced Fund”). In their petitions to the court they pled that they were insolvent and unable to pay their debts as they fell due. They requested they they be “wound up” by the court under the provisions of the Cayman Island’s Companies Law. The court appointed Joint Provisional Liquidators (the “JPLs”) with various powers, including to take control of the funds’ assets and books and records. Some commentators have expressed concern that the proceedings of the Cayman Court will prove less transparent than would a proceeding in a U.S. Court and that the Cayman Judges have a track record highly favorable to incumbent management.

The hedge funds were open-ended investment companies and intended to invest in various investments, including asset-backed securities, synthetic asset-backed securities, mortgage-backed securities, derivatives, options, swaps, and futures. Bear Stearns Asset Management, Inc. (”BSAM”) was the investment manager of the funds. Following volatility in the U.S. subprime lending market in early 2007, the funds began to suffer a significant devaluation of their asset portfolios which led to margin calls from many of its trading counterparties which the funds were unable to meet. This led to default notices by these counterparties and their exercise of rights to seize and/or sell assets that were subject of repurchase agreement or over which they held security agreements. Subsequent events led to further downward pressures and deterioration.

On July 25, 2007, the JPLs of the High-Grade Fund and Enhanced Fund filed Chapter 15 petitions pursuant to section 1504 and 1515 commencing Chapter 15 cases in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in cases 07-12383 and 07-12384 respectively. These Chapter 15 cases were ancillary to the Cayman Island’s proceedings and sought recognition of the Cayman proceedings as a “foreign main proceeding” pursuant to section 1502(4). The effect of the Chapter 15 cases will be based on whether the Cayman foreign proceedings are each determined to be a “foreign main proceeding” or a “foreign nonmain proceeding.” This is based on a determination by the court whether the debtor’s “center of main interests” (”COMI”) is in the jurisdiction where the foreign proceeding was commenced. There is a presumption that a debtor’s COMI is its place of incorporation, but this presumption can be rebutted.

Chapter 15 is the U.S. adoption of the model law on cross-border bankruptcies proposed by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. The law generally mandates the cooperation of the U.S. bankruptcy courts with those of foreign jurisdictions.

The funds both filed motions for a temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions staying execution and litigation against the funds and further sought to entrust the funds assets to the JPLs. The funds pled to the court that the relief sought would avoid piecemeal distribution of its assets and provide “breathing-room” necessary to conduct an orderly review and wind-up of the funds’ affairs so that their creditors would receive equitable treatment.

Jordan E. Bublick, Attorney at Law, Practice Limited to Bankruptcy Law, Board Certified Specialist in Consumer Bankruptcy Law (American Board of Certification), Member of the Florida Bar since 1983

Non-Domiciliary Entitled to Claim Federal Exemptions

In the pre-BAPCPA decision of In re Arispe, 289 B.R. 245 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.)(Mark, C.J.), the court held that a debtor who is a resident in Florida but not a domicile of Florida is entitled to claim the Section 522(d) federal exemptions as the Florida opt-out statute only applies to those domiciled in Florida.

The debtor was resident of Florida but not a domicile of Florida or any State as he was neither a U.S. citizen nor a permanent resident of the U.S. and therefore not able to legally form the intent to remain permanently which is an element of domicile. The Trustee argued that the Florida opt-out statute precluded the Debtor from utilizing the section 522(d) Federal exemptions. The Florida opt-out statute provides that residents of Florida are not entitled to utilize the federal exemptions provided in section 522(d). Florida Statutes, Section 222.20.

The court held that the “point of departure” in this analysis is Section 522(b) and not the Florida opt-out statute. The court noted that Section 522(b)(1) allows a debtor to utilize the federal exemptions “unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph (2)(A)….specifically does not authorize..” Paragraph (2)(A) triggers reference to the State law at the place at which the debtor’s domicile was located during the 180 days prior to filing or the greater part of the 180 day period. Since the Debtor was not domiciled in Florida or any State during the 180 days prior to filing of the petition, reference to Florida or any other State’s opt-out is not initiated to not authorize the debtor to utilize the exemptions of Section 522(d) Federal Exemptions.

The Arispe case was subsequently followed in In re Goldsmith, 2003 WL 295690 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Fla.)(Cristol, J.).

It may be noted that a new provision added by BAPCPA to Section 522(b) may have been inspired by the Arispe decision. New Section 522(b) hanging paragraph provides that “If the effect of the domiciliary requirement under subparagraph [3](A) is to render the debtor ineligible for any exemption, the debtor may elect to exempt property that is specified under subsection (d).”

Jordan E. Bublick, Attorney at Law, Practice Limited to Bankruptcy Law, Board Certified Specialist in Consumer Bankruptcy Law (American Board of Certification), Member of the Florida Bar since 1983

"Unexpired" and "Terminated" Nonresidential Leases

In re Key Largo Watersports, Inc., Case No. 07-12820 (Bankr.S.D.Fla. August 10, 2007)(Mark, J.) dealt with whether a nonresidential lease was an “unexpired lease” and therefore assumable by the Chapter 11 Debtor. Section 365(a) provides that a Chapter 11 debtor may, subject to the court’s approval, assume an unexpired lease. Section 365(c)(3) provides that a nonresidential lease may not be assumed if it was “terminated” prepetition.

The landlord sought relief from the automatic stay in order to complete eviction proceedings against the Debtor. The landlord argued that the Debtor was unable to assume the lease as it was “terminated” prior to the filing of the case and was no longer an “unexpired lease.” The landlord pointed to a prepetition letter of termination and eviction order. The Debtor argued that the lease had not been terminated and that it could therefore be assumed under section 365.

The court concluded that a prepetition final order or judgment of eviction extinguishes a Debtor’s property interest and right of possession whether or not the lease had been “terminated” prepetition. As the right of possession is extinguished, a lease is no longer an “unexpired lease” which may be assumed under Section 365. Although Section 365 can be used to cure defaults, it cannot revive an expired lease.

The court further noted that absent a prepetition eviction judgment, the issue is whether the lease was “terminated” prepetition as a nonresidential leases that has been terminated pursuant to state law cannot be assumed. Section 365(c)(3). In re Foxfire Inn of Stuart Florida, Inc., 30 B.R. 30, 31 (Bankr.S.D.Fla. 1983)(Britton, J.). The court noted that absent the eviction order in this case, the court would have had to analyze the lease and the actions taken pursuant it, including the purported termination letter, to determine whether the lease was “terminated” prepetition.

The court noted it prior decision in In re CHS Electronics, Inc., 265 B.R. 339, 342 (Bankr.S.D.Fla. 2001) in which it held that a lease remains “unexpired” if a debtor voluntarily surrenders possession prepetition to a landlord who expressly reserved all rights. The court noted that to the extent its CHS Electronics, Inc. decision was inconsistent with its decision in this case, it would stand by its decision herein.

Jordan E. Bublick, Attorney at Law, Practice Limited to Bankruptcy Law, Board Certified Specialist in Consumer Bankruptcy Law (American Board of Certification), Member of the Florida Bar since 1983

MD Fla on "Projected Disposable Income" and "Amounts Reasonably Necessary to be Expended"

The recent case of In re Arsenault, ___ B.R. ___, 2007 WL 1956277 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla.)(Williamson, J.) held that the presumptive starting point to determine a Chapter 13 debtor’s “projected disposable income” under section 1325(b)(1)(B) is the number obtained from the Form B22C which makes this calculation based on the historical CMI. The court further held that this figure may be rebutted by evidence that Form B22C’s “historic snapshot” does not form a reasonable basis for projected income forward over the life of the Chapter 13 plan. In applying these conclusions in Arsenault, the court found that the debtors’ projected disposable income should not be determined solely by Form B22C and that the court should take into account the debtor husband’s future annual bonuses that were not reflected in the Form B22C.

The court noted that in general two lines of cases dealing with this issue have emerged. One line of cases which is typified by In re Alexander, 344 B.R. 742 (Bankr.E.D.N.C.2006) holds that disposable income is based on CMI and that disposable income is the same as projected disposable income. The determination of projected disposable income is basically a mechanical test using historical income data. The other line of cases, typified by In re Hardacre, 338 B.R. 718 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.2006) holds that the term “projected disposable income” is not the same as “disposable income” and that projected disposable income must be based on the debtor’s anticipated income during the term of the plan and not be merely an average of prepetition income. The court found that Hardacre line of cases to be the better-reasoned line of cases.

The court also addressed the manner of calculation of expenses for the above-median income Chapter 13 Debtor. The court held that per section 1325(b)(3), the expenses must be determined under Form B22C without resort to Schedule J. The court noted that this section uses the term “shall” in its direction to use 707(b)(2) for expenses and it meant to take away all judicial discretion in the specific deduction areas set forth in section 707(b)(2). e.g. In re Barr, 341 B.R. 181 (Bankr.M.D.N.C.2006). The court did note though that the plan is subject to being modified under section 1329 to increase or decrease payments if circumstances change resulting in different expense calculations than those under section 707(b)(2).

Jordan E. Bublick, Attorney at Law, Practice Limited to Bankruptcy Law, Board Certified Specialist in Consumer Bankruptcy Law (American Board of Certification), Member of the Florida Bar since 1983

Another SD Fla Means Test Decision Sides with Wilson and Hartwick

In a previous post on August 4, 2007, I reviewed the Benedetti decision from the Southern District of Florida which sided with the Wilson and Hartwick line of cases and held that the Debtor was entitled to deduct her obligations on a motor vehicle lease in calculating the “means test” even though she intended to surrender the vehicle and would not be making the lease payments. In re Benedetti, ___ B.R. ___, 2007 WL 2083576 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Fla.(Cristol, J.).

On August 8, 2007, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida issued another case siding with this line of cases in In re Morgan, Case No. 06-11263-BKC-AJC (Bankr.S.D.Fla. August 8, 2007)(Cristol, J.). Morgan involved an over-median income debtor whose real property was not subject to a mortgage. The Debtor claimed a deduction for mortgage/rent under the Local Standards even though he did not actually have a mortgage payment. The chapter 13 Trustee argued that the Debtor was not entitled to this deduction as he did not actually have a mortgage payment. In accordance with the Wilson and Hartwick line of cases, the court agreed with the Debtor and held that the plain meaning of the phrase “applicable monthly expenses” found in section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) of the Bankruptcy Code entitled the Debtor to deduct from CMI the Local Standard allowance without regard to whether the Debtor actually pays a housing/rental expense. The court noted the distinction in the use of the words “applicable” and “actual” as used by the Bankruptcy Code. The court found that section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) provides that a debtor’s expenses “shall be” the “amounts specified” in the Local Standards and that the statute makes no provision for reducing the specified amounts to the debtor’s actual expenses.

The court noted that while few courts have addressed the Local Standard deduction with regard to housing, that bankruptcy courts across the country have faced the same issue with regards to the transportation deduction under the Local Standards and noted the split in authority. The court cited with approval other housing expense cases of In re Farrar-Johnson, 353 B.R. 224 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.2006) and In re Naslund, 359 B.R. 781 (Bankr.D.Mont.2006).

Jordan E. Bublick, Attorney at Law, Practice Limited to Bankruptcy Law, Board Certified Specialist in Consumer Bankruptcy Law (American Board of Certification), Member of the Florida Bar since 1983